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Trusteer's Rapport

NatWest have just sent through an important information letter to their customers highlighting a new security solution to help secure their online banking. They are using Trusteer's Rapport product (more info). Anything people do to combat malware, phishing, pharming, etc., is a good thing, and for this they should be commended. However, Trusteer make some bold claims and I'm wondering how true they really are. This needs a lot more investigation than reading through their sales rhetoric, but I'm going to get some of my initial thoughts down here, then see what I can find out.

The problem statement is well defined by Trusteer and centres around lack of user education. In a previous blog entry I wrote about 2 successful phishing attacks against an organisation that only needed one person to send an email containing their password to bring the whole network down (here). Users need to be educated into not handing out secret or personal information to anyone who asks, e.g. a bank will never ask for your PIN number - why would they? Again, see my previous blog entry as to what is happening with phishing, pharming and brand hijacking. One thing I find alarming is their statement:
"Recent malware in the wild have proved to be capable of bypassing the most advanced multi-factor authentication and security controls put in place... At Trusteer labs we have identified malware that bypass device identification, hardware and software tokens, client-side certificates, SMS authentication and transaction verification, and even card-readers..."
Well, I can see how some of these can be done relatively easily, but not all. I realise that a man-in-the-middle attack will defeat most, but if we can secure ourselves from the man-in-the-middle attack then we're fine in most cases. This is a big IF, of course, but SSL goes some way towards this (although it is also flawed in many implementations, but not in the way most phishers mount their attacks). The problem also comes from particular implementations being predictable, e.g. the RSA token that can be cracked if you know the Serial Number and the codes.

On to the Rapport solution. They claim that they can protect against: Man-in-the-Browser, Man-in-the-Middle, Keyloggers, Session Hijacking, Screen Capturing, Pharming, Phishing and Phishing Malware. Without going through all of these I will look at a few points. Firstly, let's look at keyloggers. This can't combat hardware keyloggers. It claims that it can combat software keyloggers by encrypting "all keystrokes from keyboard to browser." As I don't have an encrypting keyboard or driver, how does this work? Rapport is a browser plug-in, not a new driver. How does this stop me from rewriting the drivers on the machine and logging all the keystrokes? One wonders about the case for stopping this as well, because most banks only get you to enter three random characters of your passphrase anyway, and most have drop-down lists of numbers to select from for online PIN numbers (not card PIN numbers, which are never asked for). Also, what's the value of logging my one-time password? It's not valid by the time the attacker gets it. Having said that, combating keyloggers is a worthy goal and something we should implement if available.

Man-in-the-Middle attacks and Pharming attacks are both defeated, because Rapport "diverts traffic to the real website." How? If I have poisoned an external DNS server to point to my IP address, how do you know it's wrong, unless you have a store of my IP address already? Where do you store that? Can I update it? If not, what happens when the bank does change its servers? If this is done via strong authentication, how does that work? Is this like SSL, which has to have a valid certificate? A Pharming website won't have a valid certificate, so does this mean I'm safe? Only if I take heed of the warnings and assuming they can't update the local machine's store of the certification authorities (which you can do). Rapport supports automatic updates; are these secure or can I break into the update process?

"Rapport transparently terminates the connection to the proxy server and
diverts traffic directly to the real website."

Again, how without a list of the servers? Also, what about technologies like Microsoft's CardSpace? I know, it's Microsoft, so can we trust it, etc. However, by utilising something like CardSpace, the user doesn't enter information via the keyboard or in normal usage; it is done in a protected mode. Users can't enter their PIN number into a card that doesn't accept that information - indeed users wouldn't be the originator of the card in this scenario, so wouldn't be able to add information to it anyway. This looks to see if you are submitting the 'card' to the same site as before, by looking at things like IP address, etc. Doesn't this help against Phishing, Pharming, keyloggers and man-in-the-middle attacks? Incidentally, Rapport is only supported on XP and Vista - the same as CardSpace.

I will try to have a better look at this product and see if I can find out what the exact technologies are behind it. It may well be that their technology is secure and does help guard against these attacks, but it seems on the surface to be a collection of current technologies rather than anything new. In the mean time, NatWest should follow many other banks and institutions and get an EV SSL certificate so that the browser bar goes green and the site is authenticated by the browser with the certification authority directly. This seems as though it should be done even if other mechanisms are in place. However, I do admit that this only truly works alongside user education, but so does any security solution, including Rapport.


  1. I agree with you Luke, lack of user education is the main problem, physical tokens are a good option for security instead of using passwords so implemented my local bank but what will happen if these devices are hacked in few months or years?.

    Trusteer doesn't provide technical explications their sales rhetoric has a zero value.
    Gustavo the keylogger guy


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