Sony have detected someone trying to gain access to their various networks again, by using ID and password pairs that Sony conclude have been extracted from someone else's network. This may be a valid conclusion as it was only a small percentage of users that were affected (less than 0.1%, which is still 93,000). Sony have been upfront and quick to react, disabling the affected accounts and putting out a notice . However, their next step, according to the notice given by their Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), is to send all the users who have been affected an email asking them to change their password. Cue phishing scam! Surely some bright spark will now construct a phishing email to send out to everyone saying that theirs was one of the 93,000 IDs compromised and could they now change their password. A simple copy of the site would then enable someone to lift thousands of valid credentials from accounts that weren't compromised. The problem is that Sony's...

McAfee have launched a Beta URL shortening service with added security features. As Brett Hardin pointed out they are a little late to the game. However, there are so many abuses of URL shortening services that I commend them for trying. Basically, what their service does is allow you to create short easy URLs (like any other service). However, unlike other services, when you click on the link, it opens a frames page with the content in the bottom frame and the McAfee information in the top frame. This information includes details about the domain you are connecting to, the type of company it's registered to and a big green tick or red cross to tell you whether the site is safe or not. This is decided by their 'Global Threat Intelligence', which will block known bad URLs and phishing sites. That's good, if it works. I said above that I commend them for trying to provide this service. There are some obvious failings in their solution though, that render their prote...

I was recently talking to a fellow security professional who develops secure plug-ins for browsers and we started talking about the security of various different browsers. Most of the talk around browsers centres around how fast they are and what sort of features they have, but rarely do people talk about the security of their browser. Unfortunately, the browser is one of your weak points on the network as users have the ability to navigate to sites containing malware or phishing attacks as well as install plug-ins or run scripts that are malicious. So, which browser is the most secure? Any guesses? All browsers (and all security products for that matter) have security weaknesses and vulnerabilities. However, the architecture of the browser and certain features can make browsing safer. The feature I'm going to put forward first is web browser protection against socially-engineered malware (phishing sites). According to many of the big AV and security vendors, phishing is on the ...

Coventry Building Society have recently introduced the Grid Card as a simple form of 2-factor authentication. It replaces memorable words in the login process. Now the idea is that you require something you know (i.e. your password) and something you have (i.e. the Grid Card) to log in - 2 things = 2 factors. For more about authentication see this post . How does it work? Very simply is the answer. During the log in process, you will be asked to enter the digits at 3 co-ordinates. For example: c3, d2 and j5 would mean that you enter 5, 6 and 3 (this is the example Coventry give). Is this better than a secret word? Yes, is the short answer. How many people will choose a memorable word that someone close to them could guess? Remember, that this isn't a password as such, it is expected to be a word and a word that means something to the user. The problem is that users cannot remember lots of passwords, so remembering two would be difficult. Also, having two passwords isn't real...

I have been getting a lot of hits on this blog relating to Trusteer's Rapport, so I thought I would take a better look at the product. During my investigations, I was able to log keystrokes on a Windows 7 machine whilst accessing NatWest. However, the cause is as yet unknown as Rapport should be secure against this keylogger, so I'm not going to share the details here yet (there will be a video once Trusteer are happy there is no further threat). I have had quite a dialogue with Trusteer over this potential problem and can report that their guys are pretty switched on, they picked up on this very quickly and are taking it extremely seriously. They are also realistic about all security products and have many layers of security in place within their own product. No security product is 100% secure - it can't be. The best measure of a product, in my opinion, is the company's response to potential problems. I have to admit that Trusteer have been exemplary here. Why do I...

On 27th September the APWG released their First Half 2009 Phishing Trends Report . This provides some interesting/worrying reading. Most notably is the rise and rise of rogue anti-malware programs. Rogue anti-malware programs are programs that run on a user's machine and falsely identify malware infections. They then inform users that the malware can be removed by purchasing their anti-malware program. The installed software, in many cases, does absolutely nothing. The malware author has made their money off the user and doesn't care about them or the fact that their machine is left vulnerable to other malware. However, there is another breed of rogue anti-malware that will install other malware onto the user's machine, often adding them to botnets or adding trojans and spyware. According to Panda Labs' Luis Corrons, rogue anti-malware programs are proliferating with "exponential growth. In the first quarter of 2009 alone, more new strains were created than in a...

What are EV SSL Certificates? Simply they are Extended Validation SSL Certificates. What does this mean? Well, simply put the Certification Authority goes to more lengths to validate the identity of the person asking for (paying for) the certificate. The EV SSL Certificate then will make the browser address bar go green to certify that this really is the site you think it is and not a phishing or pharming site. It gives the user a very visual check of the validity of the website that they are using. Isn't this what Digital Certificates were supposed to do in the first place? Yes, but the Certification Authorities were more interested in taking people's money than verifying that they actually were the people in question. This led to almost anybody being able to sign up for a certificate claiming to be almost anybody. This, obviously, isn't a workable situation, so EV SSL Certificates were introduced to do the intended job, only at a higher price than the standard SSL Cert...

...that is the question. Well, I've had more of a look into Trusteer's Rapport, and it seems that my fears were justified. There are many security professionals out there who are claiming that this is 'snake oil' - marketing hype for something that isn't possible. Trusteer's Rapport gives security 'guaranteed' even if your machine is infected with malware according to their marketing department. Now any security professional worth his salt will tell you that this is rubbish and you should run a mile from claims like this. Anyway, I will try to address a few questions I raised in my last post about this. Firstly, I was correct in my assumption that Rapport requires a list of the servers that you wish to communicate with; it contacts a secure DNS server, which has a list already in it. This is how it switches from a phishing site to the legitimate site silently in the background. I have yet to fully investigate the security of this DNS, however, as most...

NatWest have just sent through an important information letter to their customers highlighting a new security solution to help secure their online banking. They are using Trusteer's Rapport product ( more info ). Anything people do to combat malware, phishing, pharming, etc., is a good thing, and for this they should be commended. However, Trusteer make some bold claims and I'm wondering how true they really are. This needs a lot more investigation than reading through their sales rhetoric, but I'm going to get some of my initial thoughts down here, then see what I can find out. The problem statement is well defined by Trusteer and centres around lack of user education. In a previous blog entry I wrote about 2 successful phishing attacks against an organisation that only needed one person to send an email containing their password to bring the whole network down ( here ). Users need to be educated into not handing out secret or personal information to anyone who asks, e.g...