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Lack of true Identity Verification forces need for EV SSL Certificates

What are EV SSL Certificates? Simply they are Extended Validation SSL Certificates. What does this mean? Well, simply put the Certification Authority goes to more lengths to validate the identity of the person asking for (paying for) the certificate. The EV SSL Certificate then will make the browser address bar go green to certify that this really is the site you think it is and not a phishing or pharming site. It gives the user a very visual check of the validity of the website that they are using.

Isn't this what Digital Certificates were supposed to do in the first place? Yes, but the Certification Authorities were more interested in taking people's money than verifying that they actually were the people in question. This led to almost anybody being able to sign up for a certificate claiming to be almost anybody. This, obviously, isn't a workable situation, so EV SSL Certificates were introduced to do the intended job, only at a higher price than the standard SSL Certificate (in part due to the actual identity validation performed no doubt). That being said, they are not expensive in the grand scheme of things and should be used far more widely than they currently are - for example NatWest still doesn't use an EV SSL Certificate at the time of writing this, instead they have ended up implementing Trusteer's Rapport at a much higher cost.

To give you some idea of cost of a digital certificate, Comodo's price is £214 per year (US$359/€359) for a single fully qualified domain name (i.e. per website); this includes their 'Corner of Trust' logo. Compare this with somewhere near $1 per customer for Trusteer's Rapport or even hosting fees and business profits! Admittedly, their cheapest SSL Certificate is only £41.95 per annum, but is £214 too much to ask when you are giving customers peace of mind, assurances over authentication and tackling phishing & pharming?

Why aren't normal certificates secure? Well, the problem is that most Certification Authorities don't do very much checking. Usually they check your domain name by sending you an email to an address that has the same domain name extension. All this says is that someone who has access to an email address on that domain wants to set up a secure web server. They don't actually check who you are. They are more interested in whether you will pay than if they should issue the certificate. This was demonstrated at IPICS today, when it was shown that VeriSign had given out a Digital Certificate to someone using the name William Gates! They have also fallen for scams, where they were duped into issuing a code signing certificate for the Microsoft Corporation by someone proving the point that they are not careful enough.

I decided to see if this was the case with other organisations, and it is. I have set up an SSL certificate just by being able to view an email sent to an address on that domain. I also wanted to know if I could be Steve Ballmer - the new Bill Gates. So, I set up an email account: Steve.Ballmer@live.co.uk using details about him, such as his year of birth: 1956. I then decided to try Thawte out, as they provide free email certificates for personal use. Sure enough, after entering the data below, I was sent an email to my address with codes to verify myself. I now have a digital certificate to sign emails from Steve.Ballmer@live.co.uk.

Surname: Ballmer
Forenames: Steve
Date Of Birth: 1956/03/24
Nationality: the United States
Email: steve.ballmer@live.co.uk
Where were you born? Detroit
Where did you go to school? Detroit Country Day School
First company you worked for? Procter & Gamble
What is your spouse's Name? Connie Snyder
How many children do you have? 3

Now, Thawte has a little trick up its sleeve here, which aides security. Before they will assign the name Steve Ballmer to the certificate, I must pass their Web of Trust, i.e. I must convince some other users that I am indeed Steve Ballmer first by meeting them face-to-face. However, if I could supply them with details such as passport number and social security number, then I'd be set. So, I can still sign my email, but if users look closely at the signature and check the certificate, they will see that I haven't been verified. However, if they don't actually look at this carefully, and with knowledge of what it means, then they will be fooled into thinking I really am Steve Ballmer. Why should the ordinary user know about this? Comodo and VeriSign, on the other hand, provide no such backup. So, I can now sign my email as Steve Ballmer. Here's my Public Key for Steve Ballmer from Comodo showing that I really am Steve Ballmer!

This isn't really good enough in this day and age of phishing scams.

Post Script Edit
Two things have happened since writing this blog post. Firstly, I have become aware of an attack on SSL Certificates by using a null value inserted in the domain name to trick the CA into issuing a certificate on an invalid domain. For example, www.natwest.com[null value].phishers.org will result in an SSL certificate being issued for www.natwest.com to the phishers.org site, which will appear valid in many browsers (but not all). Link to blog post. This won't (shouldn't) affect EV SSL Certificates though, only the Domain Validated ones.

Secondly, Comodo, to their credit, do admit that this is a problem and are takling it. They have sent me a link via email to a video clip, which in turn links to more information. That can be found here. The bottom line really is that these EV certificates are more secure, don't cost that much and should be the norm. As an industry we should be educating users into recognising and looking for these security features.

Comments

  1. I'm delighted that I have observed this weblog. Finally anything not a junk, which we go through incredibly frequently. The website is lovingly serviced and kept up to date. So it need to be, thank you for sharing this with us.

    ReplyDelete
  2. Have you heard about the scandal regarding Digitar and the 200 rogue certificates they've issued to legitimate companies? It goes to show that you have to be careful who you choose to purchase these certificates from and if possible you should go with more reputable companies.

    ReplyDelete
  3. DigiNotar is a good example of the fact that you have to be careful who you use as a CA. It also shows that there is no such thing as 100% security.

    ReplyDelete

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